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A REQUIEM ON THE NOMOS OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
Marc L. Roark±
"By the advice of their protectors (the Romans), they (the Britons) now built a 
wall across the island from one sea to the other, which being manned with a proper 
force, might be a terror to the foes whom it was intended to repel, and a protection to 
their friends whom it covered. But this wall, being made of turf instead of stone, was of 
no use to that foolish people, who had no head to guide them."
GILDAS, DE EXCIDIOET CONQUESTU 
BRITANNIAE (Trans. J.A. Giles).
In their original form, they were watched by very few spectators who had to 
squeeze in against each other, pushing and jostling, straining and craning their necks to 
get a look at the bloody action being played out before them.  These rough 
congregations, in which the spectators quickly planted themselves wherever they could 
find a place with a decent view, contained the seeds of the great spectacles of later years.  
They were primitive showcases for fighting and nothing more, and were certainly not 
prepared or stage managed in the manner that would later become commonplace…. 
It was not long, however, before seats were added and hired out to spectators who 
were thus afforded a little more comfort as they watched each pair of gladiators fight…
ALAN BAKER, THE SECRET HISTORY OF ROME’S 
WARRIOR SLAVES 8-9 (2002).  
Abstract
Comparative Law tends to focus on the differences and similarities present in 
different legal systems.  Such analysis has led some to conclude that a third legal system 
has appeared in the West and in particular in Louisiana.  The idea of a mixed jurisdiction, 
they claim, combines certain elements of Civil law and Common law into a hybrid 
system.  This article challenges the supposition that a legal system’s core identity can be 
of a mixed nature.  Rather, this article suggests that the proper way a legal system should 
±
 J.D. Loyola Law School (2002); LLM Duke University School of Law (2006). 
be viewed is through its normative values as depicted in the narratives the system spawns 
– a Nomos that directs the purveyors of the system towards the sources and identity that 
the system enchants.  Focusing primarily on Louisiana, Part I of this article describes 
three normative elements that narratives tell about the Louisiana civil law: its frenchness, 
its distinctiveness, and its dependency on a Code.  Part II then tells two narratives that 
demonstrate how these narratives are revealed, even when they are not completely 
accurate. Part III challenges the readers to inhabit the nomos. 
Part I
Institutional Identity Versus Nomos
There is a story in human history that the barbarians sitting on the verge of 
civilized society shaped human innovation.1  That, as uncivilized “tribes” threatened the 
parameters of the modern world, society had no choice but to innovate and repel the 
advances of chaos or themselves be infused with the chaos that the barbarians brought.  
The Mongols, the Huns, the Gauls, the Celts, the Galics, the Turks, and the Germans each 
were the driving force requiring societies on the other side to get better or disorganize.  
There is a similar story told in legal communities in two variations.  In law (at 
least law in the Western Legal Tradition) one is trained primarily as a civilian  or as a 
common lawyer.  The narrative is therefore told as either one of passive virtues (we stand 
at the gate and allow the other to influence our own legal tradition) or one of aggressive 
resistance (we stand aloof and reject the others as antiquated or barbaric given our 
predisposition).  To be sure there is no natural affinity between the two.  And it is 
undeniable that systems do from time to time borrow from one another, despite the 
1 See generally, WILLIAM MCNEIL, PURSUIT OF POWER: TECHNOLOGY, ARMED FORCE, 
AND SOCIETY SINCE AD 1000 (1982). 
perception that each remains superior to its counterpart.2 Such is the premise behind 
comparative law.3 The more politically friendly version tends to suggest a developing 
third family of legal tradition known for the combination of civilian and common law 
themes; that jurisdictions are becoming multi-traditional, mixed, or “bijural”.4
The danger in creating a “new legal tradition” from the relics of traditions is it 
tends to devalue the traditions that supposedly have been combined.  So, when Palmer 
writes that “because of their double genetic makeup mixed jurisdictions must appear 
2 See e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Common law and Economic Growth: Hayek might be 
right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 506-07 (2001) (arguing that the common law is more 
predictable than the civil law system because of its respect for precedents and the power 
of its appellate courts); Pierre LeGrand, John Henry Merryman and Comparative Legal 
Studies: A Dialogue, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 58 (1999) (Pierre LeGrand in a dialogue with 
John Henry Merryman explains the preference one has for either civil law or common 
law theory). 
3
  “There does not exist in the modern world a pure judicial system formed without 
exterior influence.”  ARMINJON, NOLDE, & WOLFF, TRAITE DE DROIT COMPARE 49 (1950) 
(Trans. in VERNON PALMER, LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION 4 
(1999). The observation that one system of law derives essentially from the institutions 
that can be attributed to it (or in Palmer’s case a combination of certain institutions) 
ignores the truism that comparative law cannot be simply reduced to an evaluation of 
similarities and differences: such analysis ignores relevant social, political, moral and 
economic values that more proximately determine the legal course of a jurisdiction.  See 
ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 4 (1974).  In that sense, Merryman’s conclusion 
that legal “traditions” are more appropriately considered over legal systems” reflects the 
well thought out conclusion that law tends to reflect “deeply rooted, historically 
conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, the role of law in society,” about the 
institutions of the law, and about how law is to come about. See JOHN MERRYMAN, THE 
CIVIL LAW TRADITION 2 (1969).   
4
 Vernon Palmer has written the most in this area.  See VERNON PALMER, LOUISIANA: 
MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION (1999) (collecting essays from various fields to 
illustrate the tension that exists in a “mixed jurisdiction”); THE LOUISIANA CIVILIAN 
EXPERIENCE: CRITIQUES OF CODIFICATION IN A MIXED JURISDICTION (2005) (a collection 
of essays by palmer relating to Louisiana’s dual nature through time and various code 
reforms); MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY (2001) 
(Palmer’s Magnum Opus on mixed jurisdictions).  Of Course, Palmer is not alone; The 
2003 edition of the Tulane Law Review collected numerous articles for a symposium 
entitled 2003 First Worldwide Congress on Mixed Jurisdictions.  
anomalous (and unclassified) when compared to one of their two parents,”5 he tells us 
that the two traditions cease to exist in the shadow of the third.  Said another way, the 
“new legal system” becomes an orphan, unsure whether its institutions and enabling 
devices derive from one system or anther.  Thus in the same way that comparative law 
runs the risk of exaggerating the origins of differences,6 creating a new legal family 
where there really is none risks isolating legal systems to the point of losing tradition. To 
be sure, Louisiana has never thought of itself as alone in the sense that Palmer would 
suggest that it is; it has also never thought of itself aligned with the various lists of other 
“mixed jurisdictions” opposed to being aligned by civilian values.7
Instead, like other legal systems that share legal traits between multiple systems, it 
has continued to consider itself characterized by a dominant persuasion – Louisiana is a 
Civilian jurisdiction.  This is not surprising; legal systems continue to retain a dominant 
5 See Palmer supra note ___, at 7.  
6 See Alan Watson, supra note ___, at 4:
Comparative law cannot be primarily a matter of drawing 
comparisons.  Those who would disagree with this 
proposition proceed from one of two starting points.  They 
may start from an individual legal problem they consider to 
be the same in more than one jurisdiction and examine the 
legal response to it.  As one scholar has put it, “The fact 
that the problem is one and the same warrants the 
comparability. Or they may take a branch of law, say 
Contract, and investigate in detail the differences and 
similarities of the individual rules.  But it is very doubtful if 
the comparisons are justifiable in academic terms as 
comparative law, whether the starting point is the legal 
problem or the branch of law.  Variations in the political, 
moral, social, and economic values which exist between 
any two societies make it hard to believe that many legal 
problems are the same for both except on a technical level. 
7
 Palmer’s family of “mixed jurisdictions” includes South Africa, Scotland, Louisiana, 
Quebec, Puerto Rico, The Philippines, and Israel.  See PALMER, WORLDWIDE, supra note 
___.  
legal tradition that is unmitigated, though phenomenon appears that does not derive from 
the dominant tradition.  Said slightly differently, there is a nomos to legal traditions in 
much the same way that there is a nomos to specific legal cultures – an aura that 
transcends the institutions that make up the tradition.  That nomos includes the stories we 
tell about ourselves -- the ways we perceive our institution interacting with others, and 
the insulation of our traditions against the traditions we deem contrary or destructive to 
our own.  
It also includes hints that recognize the corpus of the dominant tradition as being 
superior to the secondary tradition;8 simply put, we prefer the legal institutions we grow 
familiar with.  I remember my first year torts professor reminding us civilian students that 
the Barbarians in our class (the common law students) were indeed engaging in 
8 See Legrand, supra note ___, at 58. 
PL: As you yourself observe, there is, despite the deficits 
you identify, a feeling among many civilians that the civil 
law tradition is "superior" to the common law. Why this 
sentiment? Would it suggest that there is less receptivity 
toward alterity in the civil law than in the common law?
JHM: I came to this conclusion by reading the work of civil 
law lawyers. There are passages making it very clear that 
they find a sophistication in the civil law that they do not 
see anywhere else. They regard the common law as 
relatively crude and undeveloped. If you accept their idea 
of what constitutes superiority--the emphasis on hard-edged 
concepts, system, abstraction, and all that--I see what they 
are saying.
PL: Have you encountered the same feeling of superiority
in your common law colleagues vis-à-vis the civil law?
JHM: Of course, at least among American lawyers. But the 
values on which they hang their idea of superiority are 
completely different: there is the belief that the common 
law is more functional, more efficient, and so on. Having 
said this, I think that the feeling of superiority is stronger in 
the civil law. One of the things that bothers a lot of civil 
law lawyers about the common law is that they can not find 
it. They do not know where it is.
barbarism of the common law – fighting one another in courts to determine what the law 
was.  We needed no contest of strength to know the law; we had the law and it was held 
in a central Civil Code – as sacred as the Bible and as wise as the ancients.  Even now, as 
a scholar that engages more common lawyers than I do civilians, my mind often times 
wonders and visualizes the superior legal training I received versus the vile combat these 
poor fellows must engage in on a regular basis.  It is the vision of the noble savages
battling for the law, as the civilized world sits smugly, watching their efforts, while
holding the cannon in its hands – the precious Civil Code.  
But even by my description of the smugness that derives from certain preference 
judgments within the civilian and common law traditions, the nomos  begins to be 
revealed.  Some have suggested that the civil law suffers from a superiority belief.9  In 
Louisiana, in recent years, that belief has come under siege.  The perceptions that the 
Louisiana Civil Law has much to learn from its common law neighbors, at least within 
certain legal fields, seems to be growing in popularity.  But much of this discussion has 
also become diluted.  Instead of focusing on systems, the analysis has turned towards 
institutions within systems.  We don’t say the civil law system is superior.  Rather, we 
now talk in turns of the superiority of civil law property systems, the sales code, or family 
law.10  Let me give two  examples from the recent past.  
9 See John Henry Merryman, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1969); see also supra note 8.  
10
 Of course, historic reasons could account for this distinction.  Joseph Dainow noted the 
following:
The Civil Law in Louisiana is not the whole legal system 
but only those parts contained in the Civil Code, namely 
the law of persons and the family, property successions, 
and donations, obligations and the various private contracts 
(most important of which are sale and lease), the security 
devices of pledge and suretyship as well as privileges and 
At the 2002 Tucker Lecture, my friend Kathy Lorio asked the question “is 
Louisiana’s civil law archaic or prophetic.”11  It seems that during the drastic changes to 
the Louisiana law of successions in the 1990’s,12 the Reporter for the Louisiana Law 
Institute developed the obnoxious habit of referring to certain institutions as “Archaic,” 
ultimately memorializing that commentary in the official comments to the Code.13
Comments such as these annoyed the persons that saw the civil law, not as archaeic, but 
as a timeless system that defined persons, their property, and their transactions.  Kathy
was one of those persons and wrote passionately about civil law institutions that could be 
mortgages, plus the acquisitive and liberative prescriptions.  
In a civil law country, the so-called civilian method of 
thinking and the civilian techniques are considered as 
characterizing also the nature and development and 
interpretation of other areas of that country’s legal 
system…
Joseph Dainow, The Planiol Treatise on the Civil Law: French and Louisiana Law for 
Comparative Study, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 175, 176 (1961).  
11
 Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic or Prophetic in 
the Twenty-First Century, 63 LA. L. REV. 2 (2003).  
12
 I call the move drastic, not as a negative connotation, but because of its breadth and 
scope.  The changes to the laws of successions and donations in the 1990’s were certainly 
dramatic, as seen by the amount of law review crescendo that the changes wrought:  
seee.g., Cynthia Ann Samuel, The 1997 Successions and Donations Revision: A critique 
in honor of A.N. Yianapoulos, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1041 (1999); Katherine Shaw Spaht, The 
New Forcd Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable “Revolution,” 50 LA. L. REV. 409 
(1990); Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Aftermath of the “Revolution,” 51 LA. L. REV. 469 
(1991); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes: The Regrettable “Revolution” 
Completed, 57 LA. L. REV. 55 (1996); Katherine Connell-Thouez, The New Forced 
Heirship in Louisiana: Historical Perspectives, Comparative Law Analyses and 
Reflections upon the Integration of new structures into a classical Civil Law System, 43 
LOY. L. REV. 1 (1997); Ronald J. Scalise,  The Chaos and Confusion of Modern 
Collation: A Critical Look into an institution of Louisiana Succession Law, 75 TUL. L. 
REV. 411 (2000); see also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Changing Face of Forced 
Heirship: A New Louisiana Creation, in Palmer, Louisiana supra note ____, at 181.  
13 See LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTS 941 official comment ( ); 951 official comment (  ); 
and 1616 (  ).  The summary of archaic provisions is provided by Mr. Nathan in his 
Introduction to the New Louisiana Law of Successions in THE CIVIL CODE (2003) .  
Additionally, the law of partnership article summarizes the rention of provisions deemed 
archaic at various times and circumstances.  
deemed as more contemporary than ancient.  During that same event, Professor Patrick 
Martin of Louisiana State University stood up and addressed the audience and proudly 
proclaimed in effect, “I believe that the rest of the nation could learn from the Louisiana 
Civil Law approach to property.”   
Kathy’s approach and (Professor Martin’s on a larger scale), focused on the 
institutions of the civil law to show they have a place in the dialogue of law.  Their 
comments were to this effect: “The Civil Law is superior because x manifestation is 
better than the common law Y.”  This rubric seems misplaced to me, though I sympathize 
with their reactions. Exchanging the corpus of the tradition for the institutional preference 
compromises the essence of the civilian tradition itself.    It says, in effect, the institutions 
instead of the inherent characteristics of the Civilian Tradition (the nomos) become more 
definitive towards the civil law tradition.  Kathy (and others) are asking what does it
mean to be a civilian jurisdiction in tension with its common law surroundings.  And one 
answer to that question is that being civilian means looking civilian.  That is, we know 
we are a civilian jurisdiction because we have institutions like forced heirship and 
community property among other things that can be derived from our civilian heritage; 
our imagination has become confined to a rubric that says “we are what we look like.”      
Taken as a simple statement “we are what we look like” is a truism, correct and
timeless; it forms the basis of what this article is about – we really are what we look like, 
or rather, we are what we imagine that we look like. I want to suggest that being civilian
is less about institutional appearance and more about the nomos of the civil law. That is, 
the civil law is not definable by institutions, as institutions are temporary place holders 
within the tradition.  Rather, like so many other things, the Louisiana Civil Law is 
defined usually by the perceptions we draw regarding what we “should look like.”  Mere 
institutional appearance on the other hand does not tell us what to do with legal 
innovations that have no root in either the civil or common law traditions.  And for this 
reason, an institutional appearance cannot be the basis for locating a tradition, though it 
can be an identifier.  Let me state this using the forced heirship example.  One could 
argue from the forced heirship debate that the civilian tradition was well thought out, 
designed to protect family, and was a built in mechanism to limit dependency on the state 
for maintenance of individuals; accordingly, its deep rooted tradition in Louisiana and the 
French Civil Codes is justified by the policy reasons that support its continuance.14  One 
could also, plausibly argue today, that the transmogrification of forced heirship from a 
guarantee of family legacies to a protection for minor children and incapacitated adults is 
now the commodity of the civilian tradition on forced heirship because it serves the 
purpose of protecting vulnerable persons while preserving the individual autonomy of 
choice.15  Both are sound policy arguments that warrant deep and sober reflection.  The 
former, though carries an intrinsic quality of tradition that seems out of place when 
evaluating legal policy. 
Moreover, the civil law tradition cannot be reduced to simply a distinction that we 
have statutes and codes.  Let me provide another example.  In 1962 the Louisiana 
Supreme Court adopted a new methodology for deciding torts negligence cases, called 
the Duty Risk Analysis.16 The traditional civilian analysis requires a showing of “fault” 
14
15
16
  The Court began its Duty Risk Analysis trend in a case called Dixie Drive it Yourself 
v. American Beverage Company, 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962).  A recent case, 
Pepper v. Triplet, 864 So.2d 181 (La. 2004) (creating a doctrine of strict liability that is 
before delict liability attaches.17  The duty risk analysis therefore splits the elements 
required to prove fault into four distinct elements – cause, duty, breach and damages –
and engages in a policy analysis in evaluating their application.18 One might well 
conclude with Professor Vernon Palmer that this is merely a wolf in sheep’s clothing; 
though the conclusion may retain a civilian root – fault – its antecedent (the breach of 
duty) is purely an American common law innovation.19
What Palmer brushes by, however, is the type of analysis undertaken by judges 
applying this Duty Risk Analysis. Indeed, the analysis undertaken by judges is a policy 
an amalgamation of civil law and American tort law).  The duty risk analysis was 
spawned by policy oriented academics such as Wex Malone and Leon Greene.  Leon 
Greene, Rationales of Proximate Cause 11-13 (1927); Wex Malone, Ruminations on 
Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363 (1970). 
17 See La. C.C. art. 2315 (“Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another 
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”).  
18 See Timothy J. McNamara, The Duties and Risks of the Duty Risk Analysis, 44 LA. L. 
REV. 1227, 1233-34 (1984):
The general consensus is that six identifiable 
socioeconomic considerations influence the decision of 
whether the defendant owed a legal duty to a particular 
plaintiff not to create this specific risk of harm by the 
precise conduct which the court has already concluded was 
a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries. Obviously, there is 
interplay among these factors as the judge ponders his 
decision. As a practitioner, the writer wishes that every 
judge would tape these six considerations to his wrist like a 
quarterback so that, when he has a visceral feeling as to 
who should win, he can at least check off each of these 
elements to determine exactly why he approves the position 
of one side or another and at the same time make sure he 
has not overlooked an important consideration. These six 
factors are: (1) ease of association, (2) administrative 
considerations, (3) economic considerations, (4) moral 
considerations, (5) type of activity, and (6) precedent or 
historical considerations.
19 See Vernon Palmer, The Fate of the General Clause in a Cross-Cultural Setting: The 
Tort Experience of Louisiana, 46 LOY. L. REV. 535, 566 (2000) (“in the formulation of 
the question of negligent wrongfulness, Louisiana is, as far as I can see, in the 
mainstream of American Common Law, not the Civil Law.”).  
analysis – the very analysis that renders legislation superior to decisions and that under
girds the essence of a civilian approach to law.20 The Duty Risk analysis begins with 
the Civilian requirement for fault, interposes the questions of duty and cause, and invokes 
a policy analysis in its solution.  Palmer’s assumption that institutions “compare” and 
therefore assimilate misses the truly civilian work being undertaken by the Supreme 
Court. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s use of the Duty Risk Analysis tracks several 
fundamental viewpoints by which Louisiana jurists view themselves.  First, Duty Risk 
analysis starts and ends in the Code.  Professor Crawford’s comments, noting the scarcity 
of code provisions in the area of delict emphasize that the judicial role is one of 
interpretation, first, last, and throughout:
The Codal texts governing delict are so spare and general 
that the court must as a practical matter write most of the 
tort law with its own pen, though it is done in the name of 
interpretation.  The Civil Code requires the court to resort 
to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.  Both Gény and 
Planiol support the theory that it  is right and necessary for 
the court to resort to its own mind and conscious  to write 
20 See WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT LAW § 1.11 at 21 
(2000).  
According to strict civil law theory, legislation is the law 
and judicial opinion is only an interpretation thereof.  The 
functional result of the axiom of jurisprudence constante is 
not unlike the function effect of the common law doctrine 
of stare decisis, which mandates the court to remain faithful 
to the earlier decisions that establish a rule of law.  Under 
the Civilian notion, the interpretation of the legislation 
must also remain consistent.  
I might also remind Professor Palmer that Louisiana judges are elected; many times their 
function is as much legislative as it is judicial.  Of course, he might also remind me that 
so too are many common law judges.  Nevertheless, the Louisiana judges certainly 
appear more willing to apply policy  concerns to matters as Professor Palmer himself 
recognizes implicitly.
in detail the enormous superstructure or tort law that rests 
upon the codal texts.21
  Second, the decision to move towards Duty Risk Analysis and away from proximate 
cause as a theory of liability indicates the state’s willingness to be distinct in its legal 
institutions.  In short, the Louisiana Supreme Court demonstrated that the State’s identity 
as unique amongst its forty-nine sister states empowers, not limits its ability to interpret 
the state’s law. 
***
All of this goes to infer that “we inhabit a Nomos.”22 As Robert Cover famously 
“uncovered” for us in the 1980’s, law’s nomos is tethered to the narratives that are told 
about it:
A legal tradition is hence part and parcel of a complex 
normative world.  The tradition includes not only a corpus 
juris, but also a language and a mythos –narratives in which 
the corpus juris is located by those whose wills act upon it.  
These myths establish the paradigms for behavior.  They 
build relations between the normative and the material 
universe, between the constraints of reality and the 
demands of an ethic. These myths establish a repertoire of 
moves – a lexicon of normative action – that may be 
combined into meaningful patterns culled from the 
meaningful patterns of the past.  The normative meaning 
that has inhered in the patterns of the past will be found in 
the history of ordinary legal doctrine at work in mundane 
affairs; in utopian and messianic yearnings, imaginary 
shapes given to a less resistant reality; in apologies for 
power and privilege  and in the critiques that may be 
leveled in the justificatory enterprises of the law.23
Our Louisiana Nomos is distinct, its French, and it has a Code. 
21 Id. 
22
 Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 5, 9 (1983). 
23 Id. at 9. 
Our Nomos is distinctive from other states.  The Supreme Court’s willingness to 
part with its sister states in the area of proximate cause was empowered by a 
consciousness that embraced the uniqueness of Louisiana law.  Without such a 
perception, our legal system would be civilian in name only, having shed any and all 
likenesses of our Civil Law system. 
Our Nomos is French. The French connection in Louisiana has deep roots.  Our 
first civil code was in French with an English translation.24  Even if the original code 
contained a stronger Spanish influence, its French nature still transcended the 
document.25  Moreover, the Louisiana law institute undertook three major translation 
projects of notable French Authors: in 1959, after nearly twenty five years of planning, 
the Law Institute produced in English, Marcel Planiol’s, Traité Élémentaire de Droit 
Civi, titled simply as Planiol Civil Law Treatise.26 Six years later, the institute unveiled 
its English Translation of Charles Aubry’s Cours de Droit Civil Francais. Four years 
after that, it produced François Geny’s Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé 
positif.  
The driving force behind these projects was a recognition that there was an 
intimate relation between Louisiana law and French law, even if not always exactly the 
same.  The forward to the Planiol treatise states:
Louisiana, a civil law state, with a Civil Code based on the 
Code Napolean, has relied heavily in the past upon the 
writings of the French legal scholars for the doctrinal 
interpretation and consistent development of a code of 
general law.  Although one hundred fifty years have passed 
24
 La. Civil Code (1808). 
25
 Dainow, supra note ___, at 177.  
26
 For a description of the process undertaken in approving the project and the obstacles, 
see Dainow, supra note, at 178.  
since the adoption of the Code of 1808, Louisiana has 
produced no commentary on its Civil Code as a whole, and 
only a few of the subjects covered thereby have been 
discussed in any work that properly might be called a 
treatise.  Within the last generation of Law Reviews which 
were established at the Louisiana State, Loyola, and Tulane 
Universities have done much to answer the need for 
objective discussions of the provisions of the Code in the 
light of their underlying philosophy and historical 
development.  Nevertheless, the great wealth of material of 
this nature can still be found only in the French 
Commentaries.  In the early days under the Civil Code 
these commentaries were, in effect, Louisiana doctrine, for 
the French language was then used to a very considerable 
extent by the legal profession.  But with the passing of the 
years its use has continued to decline, as has likewise the 
number of Louisianaians sufficiently schooled in French to 
be able to avail themselves readily of French doctrinal 
materials. On the other hand, the succession of time has not 
lessened to any appreciable extent the importance of such 
discussions to the legal profession in Louisiana.  
Louisiana’s law reports and other legal writings give ample 
positive evidence of how we can profit from the writings of 
the French, and there is no lack of evidence of a negative 
sort, that a more complete knowledge of such materials 
might have been a source of great illumination to us in 
many cases.  Of the 2281 articles in the Code Napoleon, 
approximately 1800 are contained in full or in part in the 
Louisiana revised Civil Code of 1870.  By far the greatest 
number appear in our Code without change in substance.27
Finally, our Nomos is identified by our Code. The very first values we pass on to 
succeeding generations is the importance of the Code.  The Code is important because it 
defines who we are, what we have, and how we use it.  In the words of Colonel John 
Tucker, the Code is the 
most important book in your library,… because it ushers 
you into society as a member of your parent’s family and 
regulates your life until you reach maturity.  It then 
prescribes the rules for the establishment of your own 
27
 J. Denson Smith, Forward, in PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE at 3 (1959).  
family by marriage and having children, and for the 
disposition of your estate when you die, either by law or by 
testament, subject to law.  It tells you how you can acquire, 
own, use and dispose of property onerously or gratuitously.  
It provide the rules for most of the special contracts 
necessary for the conduct of nearly all of your relations 
with your fellowmen: sales, loans (with or without 
security), leases, usufructs, and servitudes; and finally, all 
of the rights and obligations governing your relations with 
your neighbor and fellowman generally.28
The Code prevented the Louisiana Law Institute from adopting the Uniform Commercial 
Code in 1967.  It also required certain large scale revisions in 1870 following the most 
significant reclassification of persons and property in modern history: the mandated 
ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment changed more than 
the state of race relations, but completely reorganized social relations and property 
regimes.  In Louisiana, that reorganization started in the Code.  The Code captivates our 
attention in Louisiana, perhaps because it is so logical.  It is also a part of what identifies 
us as Louisiana Lawyers. 
Principally, we know the Nomos and its features by the stories we tell.  Law is as 
much about the stories that are told in the past – the formative narratives as it is about the 
hungering for the future – “the messianic yearnings.”    In a certain sense then, Kathy’s 
title mentioned above is exactly right:  the arcane institutions of the past are bright 
predictors for the future.  
The narratives that are told tend to shape communities as well as legal norms.  We 
don’t live in isolation from one another.   Rather a communal character inures to people 
who share the same stories.  No person is an island in a normative story – even those that 
chose to recluse from social standards do so within the context of a shared story – one 
28
 John H. Tucker, Forward in A.N. Yianapoulos, Louisiana Civil Code, at XXI (2003).  
they happen to reject but are still apart of.  “The part that you or I choose to play may be 
singular, but the fact that we can locate it in a common ‘script’ renders it ‘sane’ – a 
warrant that we share a nomos.”29
One obvious inference then is that the Louisiana Civil Law tradition does not 
exist in isolation from either its past or its future.  Indeed a brief skimming of the latest 
Louisiana Law Review, Tulane Law Review, or Loyola Law Review, will provide 
undoubtedly an article in which the central theme is “ X law” is faithful to the civilian 
tradition and should be continued; or that same law is either unique to the point of 
embarrassment or to the point of supremacy and therefore should be changed to conform 
with the rest of the states/ maintained as better than the common law alternatives.  We are 
constantly in the market of comparing the institutions we have against others dissimilar to 
us to decide whether the tradition is better served by change or by remaining the same.    
An even more obvious point is that the nomos naturalizes its institutions. That is, 
the tradition can grow in ways that are different from its tradition but never without some 
symbolic glance towards it.  So, the Louisiana Law Institute’s decisions to publish 
translations of the French treatises by Marcel Planiol, Charles Aubry and Rau, and 
Charles Geny indicate if nothing else a passive reflection that at some deep point the 
Louisiana narrative begins in French law; the substance of which some Louisiana 
scholars have contested, but whose normative power they do not cross. Nevertheless, the 
culture tells us that French sources are important even if the main body of the law reflects 
other cultures.  The language variance has the same effect: despite the fact that the Civil 
Code was amended in 1973 to anglicize the third party contract, courts and lawyers still 
29
 Cover, supra note ____, at 8. 
refer to stipulations pour autrui, though I dare say not many speak French.30  Similarly, 
in Louisiana we have projets that consider changes to the Constitution, not projects or 
reports.   Thus, the nomos takes variations that otherwise would feel awkward and 
unstable, and incorporates them as if they were a natural part of the institution.   
All of these factors tend to be worked out by the narratives that help shape the
nomos.  I offer two narratives that reveal the Nomos; there are certainly others.  I chose 
these two because they represent the collision of institutions and ideals.  The first is the
narrative of the Code Noir and Louisiana slave law.  The second narrative is the adoption 
of Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code in Louisiana.  Both demonstrate 
elements of the Nomos and how we begin to formulate an identity as a civilian state. 
Part II
Louisiana Narratives
1. Narrative No. 1 -- Louisiana Slavery and the Code Noir
Slavery came to Louisiana in the early eighteenth century, relatively later than the 
rest of North America.  Louisiana was colonized by the French in the early seventeenth 
century,  Reasons for the delay include the French preference for mining over agriculture; 
the preference for using slavery for building infrastructure; and the fact that the driving 
motivation for obtaining Louisiana was not economic but political: the French didn’t 
30 See e.g., Alexander v. Gary, 924 So.2d 428 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006); Barnhill v. 
Remington Oil and Gas Corp., 918 So.2d 52 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2005); Joseph Hospital 
Service Distr. No. 2 of St. Mary Parish, 923 So.2d 27 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2005) etc…. 
Indeed, since 1990 fifty four cases have used the term stipulation pour atrui in the place 
of the anglicized “third party beneficiary contract.”  
want the British to have it. 31  In fact, it was not until the Spanish gained the territory in 
1763 did agricultural slavery begin to flourish in the colony.32
Despite the fact that the French were not committed to agricultural development
of the territory, slavery was still an institution desired by the French colonials. In 1704, 
the colonists in Louisiana began petitioning the government for the introduction of slave 
labor to clear the land.33 With the introduction of large numbers of slaves into the 
territory, new laws had to be shaped to control the slavery system.  Thus, in 1724, the 
Code Noir was introduced into the vast French colony.34 The Code Noir regulated 
everything touching the institution of slavery, including religion,35 nourishment and 
care,36 control,37 prosecution,38 status,39 seizure, and emancipation of African slaves.  The 
31 GRADY KILMAN, SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOR IN COLONIAL LOUISIANA 1699-1803, 
10 (1972). 
32
 France claimed the Louisiana territory in the late seventeenth century, and held the 
territory until the end of the Seven Year’s War. Then, in 1763, France ceded to Spain the 
vast territory -- first by secretive agreement, and then officially in the Treaty of Paris. 
King Louis XV informed the Superior Council by letter dated April 21, 1764 of the 
ceding of the Louisiana Territory to Spain.  FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, HISTORY OF 
LOUISIANA 92-93 (1882).
33 Id. 
34
 The 1724 Code Noir was specific to Louisiana, though its antecedent was a 1685 
Codification designed for French Possessions in the West Indies. See Vernon Valentine 
Palmer, The Origins and Authors of the French Code Noir, 56 LA. L. REV. 363, 367 
(1995); Hans W. Baade, The Gens de Couleur in Louisiana: Comparative Slave Law in 
Microcosm, 18 CARDOZA L. REV. 535, 541 (1996).    
35 See Code Noir arts. 2-5; id. art. 11.  The author in a previous piece described the 
relation of the Code Noir to the revolutionary atmosphere surrounding the territory.  In 
that piece, notable cases applying the articles of the Code Noir are cited.  See Marc L. 
Roark, Louisiana Colonial Slavery Law – Revolution, Property and Race (Copy on file 
with Author).    
36 See Code Noir arts. 18-21.
37 See Code Noir arts. 25-28.   
38 Id. 
39 See e.g., Re Indian, 4 La. Hist. Q. 355 (1729)( “Petition for emancipation: ‘Duplesis, 
settler at Natchitoches, holds a ‘kind of will’ … by late François Viard, who freed an 
osage woman slave and reserved 100 pistoles in behalf of her catholic 
Code Noir remained the central piece of slavery legislation even after the French lost 
control of the territory. 40 It is this code – the Code Noir – that became the lasting legal 
force behind the slavery laws.  Like the civil code’s “ushering” of persons into society, 
the Code Noir specifically exempted a certain class of persons from society,41 and 
directed their affairs in much the same pattern as the Civil Code.  
The Code Noir was introduced into the Louisiana territory in 1725. Over the 
course of one hundred and fifty years it was altered and amended regularly but continued 
to maintain the corpus of its organization.  For example the initial Code Noir was divided 
into seven parts: Religion; Clothing and Nourishment; Police; Crimes and Punishments; 
Witnesses, Donations, Successions, and Actions; Legal Seizures, Slaves as Movable 
Property; and Grants of Liberty.42 When a new “black code” was desired, the drafters 
turned to the former Code Noir as a model.43 While retaining many of the substantive 
provisions of the previous Code Noir, the new code was divided into two primary 
sections: (1) general provisions; and (2) crime and punishment.44
instruction….Attorney General approves emancipation… but the black code forbids cash 
legacies to a slave.”).  
40
 The Code Noir was revested in 1769, after O’Reilly assumed control of the territory. 
Hans W. Baade, The Spanish Law of Slavery in Spanish Luisiana 1769-1803, in THE 
LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA HISTORY: THE SPANISH 
PRESENCE IN LOUISIANA 1763-1803, Vol. II 371 (1996) (citing AGI, Santo Domingo, Leg. 
2543 f. 195 (available on microform from Loyola University, New Orleans).  
41
 While the Civil Code told persons how to own property, the Code Noir specifically 
exempted slaves from property ownership.  In the Code Noir, the slaves were the 
property.  Thus its regulations were not empowering but rather inapplicable.  Both codes 
regulated marriage and children. 
42 See Palmer, Authors and Sources of the Original Code Noir, in Palmer CODIFICATION, 
supra note ___, at 121.  
43 See John T. Hood Jr., A Crossroad in Louisiana History, 22 LA. L. REV. 709, 711 
(1962). 
44 Compare 1725 Code Noir with 1806 Code Noir, in 1 LISLETT’S DIGEST 100-132.  
Both versions of the Code Noir were designed to provide owners of slaves with 
direction regarding every aspect of a slave’s life. The code’s purpose was holistic; that is, 
it meant to treat every aspect of slavery by reference to a single compendium of laws.  
But the stories we tell about the Code Noir demonstrate that it was as much a civil code 
of slavery as it was a collection of laws. 
While the fact that the compendium of laws regulating one area were 
encompassed in one complete code certainly suggests a similarity to the civil code,45 the 
use of the Code Noir as a source for the later civil code of 1806 serves as more 
compelling evidence of its civilian character, regardless of how modest that role was. 
Amongst other sources, the Code Noir served to create a source of instruction for the 
territorial reorganization of its laws and structure. 46 Previously, the Code Noir served as 
a source for the infamous O’Reilly’s Code under Spanish Provincial rule. 47
The decision to include provisions into a code is a matter of contemporary 
judgment, reflecting the currents of the time.  But the decision whether such inclusions 
reflect faithful decisions are issues of reflection that appear most contestable from afar.  
Notably, no one contends or contended that the Code Noir was anything but a civilian 
extension to the law of slavery.  From its structure to its sources, the civilian character 
transcends the Code Noir.  
45 See David Gruning, Codifying Civil Law: Principle and Practice, 51 LOY. L. REV. 57 
(2005).  
46
 Vernon Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish Perception: Historical 
Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 
La. L. Rev. 1067, 1073 n.13 (2003).  In addition to the Code Noir, other sources included 
were the Las Siete Partidas, Febrero, the Institutes, Blackstone, Justinian's Digest, Curia 
Philipica, Gaius, the Fuero Real, the Ordinances of Bilbao, and local Louisiana statutes. 
Id. 
47
 Vernon Palmer, French Connection supra note ___, at 1155.  
What we do debate, however, is whether the Code Noir’s sources are purely 
French or reflect other traditions.  As we discussed above, this transcends through 
language and institutions that have long sense left the ordinary usage of social 
construction, but which retain significance in the legal identity of the state.  Nowhere is 
this story more contested than with regards to the nature of slave laws in Louisiana.  That 
is, no one contests that the laws were civilian; rather, the issue that has been debated is a 
question of which civilian character: French, Spanish, or Roman.  
The crux of the story requires a brief description of the historical facts relating to 
the transfer of the territory from France to Spain and then back to France again. France 
claimed the Louisiana territory in the late seventeenth century, and held the territory until 
the end of the Seven Year’s War.48 Then, in 1763, France ceded to Spain the vast 
territory -- first by secretive agreement,49 and then officially in the Treaty of Paris.50 King 
48 FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 92-93 (1882).  The Seven Years 
War, also called the French and Indian War pitted France against Britain primarily, but 
also involved Spain, the American Colonies, and the Native Americans.  
49 See Preliminary Act of Cession between France and Spain (“Treaty of Fontainebleau”), 
November 3, 1762, Fr.-Sp., 42 CONSOL. TREATY SERIES 239, 241.  Scholars have offered 
several viable reasons for French cession of Louisiana to Spain include the unloading of 
an economic drain from the French economy,  the compensation for Spanish loss of 
Florida in the Seven Years War, and even a pre-orchestrated bargained for exchange for 
Spain’s alliance against Britain in the same war.  See Author S. Aiton, The Diplomacy of 
the Louisiana Cession in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA 
HISTORY: THE SPANISH PRESENCE IN LOUISIANA 1763-1803 VOL. II, 23 (1996).  
50 See Definitive Treaty of Peace Between France, Great Britain and Spain, Signed at 
Paris (“Treaty of Paris”), February 10, 1763, GB, Fr. & Sp., 42 CONSOL. TREATY SERIES 
279, 324.  Interestingly, the Treaty of Paris does not cede Louisiana to Spain directly.  
Rather, the treaty’s significance is the securing of France’s possession in Louisiana to 
validate the earlier transfer by the Preliminary Act of Cession between France and Spain.  
The Treaty of Paris only draws a line of separation in the Americas between French and 
British possessions.  Id. §VII, at 325-26.  
Louis XV informed the Superior Council by letter dated April 21, 1764 of the ceding of 
the Louisiana Territory to Spain.51
On March 5, 1766, the first Spanish Governor, Don Antonio de Ulloa, arrived in 
New Orleans and established Spanish provincial rule.52  Ulloa maintained French 
political structures, even issuing his orders through the French Commandant Phillip 
Aubrey. Those that resided in the territory, particularly those of Creole descent,53 feared 
that the new Spanish Administration would bring a complete denial of their rights as 
colonists.54  Additionally, the French colonists felt betrayed by their King as mere pawns 
of politics.  The French colonists envisioned not only the present loss of country but the 
potential loss of property.55 Gayarre, a Louisiana historian, summarizes succinctly the 
French Colonial apprehensions of this transfer:
51 See Letter from King Louis XV, King of France to Mr. D’Abbadie, Governor of 
Louisiana (April 21, 1764) translated and reproduced in CHARLES E. GAYARRE, A 
HISTORY OF LOUISIANA: FRENCH DOMINATION Vol. II, 109 - 111 (3d Ed. 1882).   
52
  Gilbert C. Din, Spaniards, Planters, and Slaves 36 (1999).
53
 At the time, Louisiana was composed of persons from Creole, English, and Spanish 
decent.  Indeed, the territory identified itself as French, though its people were from 
varying nationalities.  See CHARLES GAYARRÉ, HISTORY OF LOUISIANA : THE SPANISH 
DOMINATION VOL. III 185 (1882).  
54
 Note that King Louis XV, somewhat presumes this inference in his Letter to Mr. 
D’Abbadie and reassures the colonists that their property rights are secure.  See Letter 
from King Louis XV:
I hope …. that the titles of the inhabitants to their property 
shall be confirmed in accordance with the concessions 
made by the Governors and ordaining commissaries of said 
colony…hoping moreover that his Catholic Majesty will be 
pleased to give his subjects of Louisiana the marks of 
protection and good will which they have been made more 
effectual, if not counteracted by the calamities of war.  
Id. at 185.
55 See CHARLES E. GAYERRE, supra note 9, at 113.  Gayarre summarizes succinctly the 
French Colonial apprehensions of this transfer:
As Frenchmen, they felt that a deep wound had been 
inflicted on their pride by the severing in twain of 
As Frenchmen, they felt that a deep wound had been 
inflicted on their pride by the severing in twain of 
Louisiana, and the distribution of its mutilated parts 
between England and Spain.  As men, they felt the 
degradation of being bartered away as marketable objects; 
they felt the loss of their national character and rights, and 
the humiliation of their sudden transformation into 
Spaniards or Englishmen without their consent.  As 
colonists, as property owners, as members of a civilized 
society, they were agitated by all the apprehensions 
consequent upon a change of laws, manners, customs, 
habits and government.
Thus, in 1768, six hundred plantation owners and merchants sent a petition to the 
Superior Counsil asking that Governor Ulloa be expelled from the territory, and that 
certain rights and liberties be restored.56  Governor Ulloa was removed, and, at least 
temporarily, the colonists believed that repatriation was in their future.  Those hopes were 
short lived.  Spain responded by replacing the removed Governor Ulloa with Governor 
Alejandro O’Reilly.  O’Reilly acted swiftly to punish insurgents and restore Spanish rule. 
One of the first acts of Governor O’Reilly was to replace the French legal structures with 
a visibly Spanish presence.57  Specifically, O’Reilly dissolved the Superior Council 
believing it to be a tool of the colonists towards insurrection.58
Louisiana, and the distribution of its mutilated parts 
between England and Spain.  As men, they felt the 
degradation of being bartered away as marketable objects; 
they felt the loss of their national character and rights, and 
the humiliation of their sudden transformation into 
Spaniards or Englishmen without their consent.  As 
colonists, as property owners, as members of a civilized 
society, they were agitated by all the apprehensions 
consequent upon a change of laws, manners, customs, 
habits and government.
56 Id. 
57 See Gustavus Schmidt, Ordinances of Don Alexander O’Reilly, 1 LA. L. J. 1 (1841) 
(translating three orders of Governor O’Reilly relating to the substitution of French Law 
From the start, the Spanish were viewed with disdain by French settlers who 
continued to resonate more with the mére patrie than they did with their colonial 
governors.59  O’Reilly’s punishment of the insurrectionists of 1768 didn’t ease the 
tension as French-Louisianaians referred to him as “Bloody O’Reilly,” a practice that 
continued long after his rule as Governor ceased.60  But just as French citizens did indeed 
prefer the mother country to Spanish provincial rule, those feelings were clearly more 
nationalistic.  Indeed, the Spanish did more to assist colonists in creating a viable 
Louisiana economy.  And Spain was sensitive to the French people’s desire for their 
mother country as long as that sensitivity did not spread to insurrection.  A 1779 and 
1782 trade cédula, which permitted direct commerce between France and Louisiana 
seemed to placate French citizens and temper reactions against the Spanish.61
Relating to slavery, O’Reilly continued the enforcement of the Code Noir, 
expressing “admiration for [the Code’s] “wisdom and piety.” 62 The question that has 
been debated most recently is whether the Code Noir continued a French version of rule 
or whether it was supplanted by a Spanish version.  A follow-up question seeks to 
uncover the normative value of the Code Noir.  
for Spanish Law and structure, enacted and published in French November 25, 1769); see 
also KATE WALLACH, BIBLIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SOURCES 
ROMAN, FRENCH, AND SPANISH 67 (1955).
58
 Hereinafter, the article will refer to the Superior Council simply as “the Council.”
59
 Ernest R. Liljegren, Jacobinism in Spanish Louisiana, 22 LA. HIST. Q. 47, 49 (1939).  
60 Id. at 47.  
61 Id. 
62
 Hans W. Baade, The Spanish Law of Slavery in Spanish Luisiana 1769-1803, in THE 
LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA HISTORY: THE SPANISH 
PRESENCE IN LOUISIANA 1763-1803, Vol. II 371 (1996) (citing AGI, Santo Domingo, Leg. 
2543 f. 195 (available on microform from Loyola University, New Orleans).  
To the first, Hans Baade has pointed to several provisions of Alfonso el Sabio’s 
Siete Partidas63 that, though sharing a common Roman heritage, did not enter the French 
Code Noir of 1724.64 For example the Siete Partidas included a provision that declared 
slavery as contrary to “natural reason.”65  Similarly, under traditional Spanish law, 
“slaves were entitled to file complaints of cruelty against their masters,” and were entitled 
to judicial sale when cruelty was established.66  Baade points to these early provisions as 
a source of more favorable treatment towards slaves by Spanish law then French; indeed, 
citing to the Informe, Baade notes that the Spanish perceived that in “modern times, 
slaves received ‘incomparably milder’ treatment in Spanish overseas possessions than in 
the American colonies of France, England or the Netherlands” built around a “more 
63
 Literally translated the “Seven Departures,” the Siete Partidas was compiled in 1265 
by King Alfonso X, and governed peninsular Spain.  See Dylan O. Drummond, The Rule 
of Capture in Texas -- Still so misunderstood after all these years, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
1, 31 (2004).  See also David Grunning, Mapping Society through Law: Louisiana Civil 
Law Recodified, 19 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 4 (2004) (discussing the role of the Siete 
Partidas in the Louisiana Civil Law tradition).    
64 See Baade, supra note 12, at 368.  
65 See THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, WHICH ARE STILL IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF 
LOUISIANA, Part IV Title 21, at 581 (Trans. L. Moreau Lislet & Henry Carleton) (1820) 
(“Slavery is a condition and state of things established anciently by nations, by which 
men who were naturally free, are made slaves, and put under the dominion of others, 
contrary to natural reason.”). See also Baade supra note 55, at 368.  
66 See SIETE PARTIDAS supra note 59, Law 6, at 584:
We likewise say that if a man be so cruel to his slaves, as to 
cause them to die of hunger, or strike or chastise them so 
severely with the whip, that they cannot bear it; they may 
then complain to the judge, who ought, in virtue of his 
office, to enquire into the truth of the facts, and if he finds 
them to be so, he ought to sell the slaves, and give the price 
to their master.  And this ought to be done in such a 
manner, that the slaves shall never again come under the 
power or dominion of the person , by whose fault they were 
sold.
See also Baade, supra note 55, at 368
favorable ratio of freedman to slaves in Spanish possessions.”67 As Spain gained control 
of the territory, some of these incidents became incorporated into the Louisiana slave 
laws. Baade argues that the Spanish laws of Castile soon replaced all law in Louisiana, 
including the Code Noir.68 Baade’s contention is supported by Raphael Rabalais, who 
concludes, among other things that the early Louisiana Courts cited Spanish codes more 
than they did French codes, and cited French treatises more than they did Spanish 
treatises, cited Spanish statutes more than French statutes.69  This approach was described 
fully by Professor Rudolfo Batiza in the early 1970’s.70
The Baade/ Rabalais/ Batiza position is countered by A.N. Yianapoulos, who 
argues that the Spanish laws were less than enforceable against a resilient French 
population. 
Nevertheless, there are indications of a strong attachment 
by the French population to its own laws and customs. 
Rather than adhering to the official Spanish legal system, 
the French population frequently settled affairs 
extrajudicially under French laws, customs, and usages. 
This state of affairs continued until the retrocession of the 
Louisiana territory to France on October 1, 1800, by the 
Treaty of San Idelfonso. France did not assume sovereignty 
67
 Baade, supra note 55, at 368 (citing Informe del Consejo de Indias Acerca de la 
observancia de la Real cedula de 31 de Mayo de 1789 sobre la educacion, trato y 
ocupaciones de los escalvos, reprinted in J.A. Saco, Historiade la Esclavaitud de la Raza 
Africana en el Nuevo Mundo y en special en los Paises Americo-Hispanos, 3 Vols 
(Habana 1938).  
68
 However, consider a Louisiana Supreme Court opinion fifty-three years later which 
references the proclamation issued by Governor O’Reilly continuing the Code Noir’s 
effect in the territory.  See Beard v. Poydras, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 348 (La. 1816) (“the French 
Law, called the Code Noir… was in force in this country.  To establish this, a  
proclamation is produced, issued by Don Alessandro de O’Reilly, of the 27th of August, 
1769, whereby it is continued in force.”). 
69
 Raphael J. Rabalais, The Influence of Spanish Laws and treatises on the Jurisprudence 
of Louisiana 1762-1828, 42 LA. L. REV. 1485, 1504 (1982).  
70 See Rudolfo Batiza, The actual sources of the Louisiana Projet of 1823: A General 
Analytical Survey, 47 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1978).  
until November 20, 1803. During the twenty-day period of 
French control, Pierre de Laussat, as colonial prefect for 
Napoleon, abolished the Spanish authorities and established 
a municipal government in Louisiana. There was not 
sufficient time to organize a new legal system; Laussat's  
only change in the law was the reintroduction of the French 
code noir and the repeal of the Spanish slave legislation.  
When the United States took possession of the Louisiana 
territory on December 20, 1803, the bulk of the preexisting 
laws were in force.71
Louisiana was a French Colony, with a French History. Of course what the citizens did 
and what the Government enforced are oftentimes different questions; would the Courts 
apply French law or Spanish law in the territory would seem to answer this debate.  
Surprisingly, this did not seem to present the difficulty that one might expect.  Palmer 
notes: 
 O'Reilly had issued a proclamation that all proceedings in 
civil and in criminal matters would be according to the laws 
of Castille and of the Indies. By all accounts, this change of 
substantive law did not have a great impact because of the 
common origin, hence, the similarity of laws between 
Spain and France.  As a consequence, no noticeable 
disruption occurred when the courts began applying the 
new body of laws. Nevertheless, O'Reilly issued a decree in 
1769 abolishing French law. It provided that thereafter the 
laws in effect would be a compilation referred to as the 
"Code O'Reilly." It was a combination which borrowed 
from the Laws of the Indies, the Siete Partidas, and the
code noir. Although there were occasional adjustments of 
the judicial structure and of the substantive laws of 
Louisiana over the period of Spanish rule which lasted 
some forty years, the basic form of the judicial system 
remained unchanged.72
The sources of the laws may have been Spanish, but the colonial nomos was French.  
***
71
 A.N. Yianapoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative Essay, 78 TUL. L. 
REV. 379, 382-83 (2003).  
72
 Vernon Palmer, French Connection supra note ___, at 1155.  
There are principally two ways to address this narrative.  One is purely historical,  
That is, the legal scholar can engage the texts, identify the provisions that seem most 
French, Spanish, or Roman, and argue vigorously that those texts create some 
institutional identity for the territory.  This has been the primary means of debate to this 
point. 73 The Second way is to consider what that debate and the accompanying historical 
facts have to say about the nature of Louisiana law.  That is, can there be a nomos inside 
this debate?
73
 Indeed both French and Spanish legal heritages derive from the Roman Civil Law 
system. See Hans W. Baade, supra note 55, at 371. Much ink has been spilled (on many 
many law review pages) regarding the debate whether the 1724 Code Noir reflected a 
Romanist tradition or was a French Caribbean innovation.  I take the position that the 
Code Noir was a distinctly French scheme, but with distinct Romanist influences. 
Compare Palmer supra note 47 (distinguishing several points of Roman Law from the 
Code Noir); with Hans W. Baade, The Bifurcated Romanist Tradition of Slavery in 
Louisiana, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1481, 1485 (1996) (maintaining a Romanist influence on the 
Code Noir sources).  See also Alan Watson, The Origins of the Code Noir Revisited, 71 
TUL. L. REV. 1041, 1051 (1997) (conceding the sources as Non-Roman, but also 
reasserting certain Romanist influences).  Nevertheless, the sources of the laws as French 
Colonial or Roman make little difference to the ultimate disposition of this article. 
From that Roman system of law (which also legislated rules for slavery), both the 
French and Spanish laws regulating slavery were influenced substantially. For example, 
Judith Schaffer draws the obvious connection between the Roman law of redhibition and 
redhibtion allowed under the Code Noir.  See e.g., ALAN WATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW 
(1987) & W.W. BUCKLAND, THE ROMAN LAW OF SLAVERY: THE CONDITION OF THE 
SLAVE IN PRIVATE LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN (2000).  Both Watson and 
Buckland’s treatments of Roman law slavery provide detailed analysis of the Roman laws 
regulating the institution.  Judith Kelleher Schafer, Roman Roots of the Louisiana Law of 
Slavery: Emancipation in American Louisiana, 1803-1857, 56 LA. L. REV. 409, 409 
(1995) (“The most important survival of Roman law in the law of slavery in Antebellum 
Louisiana was the concept of redhibition.”).  Another aspect of Roman slave law 
transmogrified to the new world context was the notion of Obsequium or respect for 
one’s former patron.  See Justinian Digest 37:15.1-11.  Though the tradition of showing 
respect to your former master is traceable to Roman ancestry, the practice was mutated to 
include respect for all white persons in the Code Noir of 1806.  See Black Code art. 40 
(“And it be further enacted that Free People of Color ought never to strike white people 
nor presume to conceive themselves equal to the white; but on the contrary that they 
ought to yield to them in every occasion and never speak nor answer to them but with 
respect under the penalty of imprisonment according to the nature of the offense.”).  
We have suggested that the nomos is identified by three factors.  First the 
prevalence of a Code centric debate.  For example, the fact that the Code Noir is in a 
structured Code certainly aids our argument.  But even if it were not, other phenomenon 
warrant the same conclusion.  So for example, one could draw the conclusion that the 
Code Noir’s past, the confusion regarding what legal institution was dominant, and the 
need for order contributed to a Civil Code being adopted.  Consider Roger Ward’s 
argument:
Louisiana's decision to adopt a civil code was based on 
necessity. Because of its motley colonial past, Louisiana's 
legal system was actually an interesting amalgamation of 
Spanish and French law. The Spanish law in effect at the 
time of the transfer of the territory to the United States was 
composed of eleven different codes, containing more than 
20,000 laws, with many conflicting provisions. Relatively 
few Spanish legal treatises were available to help 
Louisianians understand and interpret these laws.  
Likewise, remnants of French law such as the Customs of 
Paris, Ordinance of 1667, Royal Edicts, and the code noir 
were interspersed in the Spanish law governing the 
territory.74
The Code Noir was certainly a part of this background – for better or worse. 
We have also argued that there is a perception of distinctiveness that exists in 
Louisiana.  In the area of slave law, that norm has manifested itself towards making value 
weight judgments of which system was more humane.  For example, consider Vernon 
Palmer’s argument:
The one constant of barbaric laws is that they did not seem 
harsh to the barbarians. The Roman law of the talion--an 
eye for an eye, tooth for tooth, etc.--originally seemed 
equitable compared to the unlimited right of revenge that it 
superseded. The talion introduced for the first time the 
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requirement of limited and proportionate response. The
Code Noir which the French monarch introduced into
Louisiana in 1724, was apparently a well-intentioned 
attempt to ameliorate the condition of slaves. As there were 
previously no controls governing how a master might treat 
a slave, certain elements of enlightened society regarded 
the Code Noir as humane and reformatory. Both the lex 
talionis and the Code Noir however, are victims of moral 
and historical relativism. These "improvements" will 
always be scorned for the inequity they presupposed rather 
than the incidental evils they suppressed.75
At times, our nomos of distinctiveness has caused those on the outside to also laud our 
attempt to be human, in the face of owning humans. Consider Jonathan Bush’s reading of 
the historical account:  “There were also no systematic slave codes in the English 
colonies, in contrast to such other New World texts as the French Code Noir or the 
Codigo negro caroleno of Santo Domingo. In short, whatever the timing and extent of 
slavery in each English colony, at every step English colonial law seemed to take slavery 
more or less for granted.”76  However, ultimately,  we simply weren’t distinct enough:  
The Louisiana code noir of Colonial times and the Black
Codes of the eighteen sixties; the pre-Civil War denial of 
the vote to Negroes, even to wealthy and educated free men 
of color; the ebb and flow of Negro rights in the 
Constitutions of 1864 and 1868; the 1879 transfer of 
political power from police juries and the legislature to the 
Governor; the close election of 1892 and the 1896 victory 
for white supremacy; the grandfather clause and the 
complicated registration application form in the 
Constitution of 1898; the invalidity of the grandfather 
clause and the consequent resort to Mississippi's 
understanding and interpretation clause; the effectiveness 
of the white primary as a means of disfranchising Negroes; 
the invalidity of the white primary and the consequent need 
to revive enforcement of the interpretation test; the White 
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League and the Citizens' Councils; the Black League and 
the N.A.A.C.P.; the Battle of Liberty Place in 1874 and the 
Ouachita voting purge of 1956--these are all related 
members of a series, all reactions to the same dynamics that 
produced the interpretation test and speak eloquently of its 
purpose.77
As one commentator of Judge Wisdom noted, 
it was necessary to view the interpretation test as part of 
'the State's historic policy and the dominant white citizens' 
firm determination to maintain white supremacy in state 
and local government by denying to Negroes the right to 
vote,' it was necessary to begin at the beginning. In the 
beginning, as Judge Wisdom aptly noted, ' t here was, of 
course, no problem.' There was 'no problem' because 'the
Code Noir, from the 1724 Code to Act 33 of the Territorial 
Legislature of 1806, disfranchised Negroes.'  Surveying the 
constitutional developments embodied in the Louisiana 
Constitutions of 1812, 1845, and 1852, Judge Wisdom 
noted, with obvious pride in the history of his state, that the 
latter two were 'progressive and broadly democratic 
document s .' The Constitution of 1845 'did away with the 
tax-paying qualification for voters and established universal 
suffrage for free white males, regardless of wealth and 
literacy.' The Constitution of 1852 'introduced registration 
of voters, a progressive step many years in advance of most 
states.'  Despite the presence in Louisiana of many free 
blacks, however, the franchise continued to be limited to 
white males:
Thus, from the Code Noir of 1724 until 1864, the 
organic law of the state ordained that only free white males 
could vote or hold office. This was in a state where there 
were thousands of free men of color. Many of these were 
well educated and owned slaves. Except for suffrage, they 
possessed the civil and legal rights of white citizens.78
And then there are the times our distinctiveness and its purposes became brutally honest 
with one another – when our nomos became the source of our disappointment. Gayerre 
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reflects on the nature of the Code Noir in the sparsely inhabited territory of early colonial 
Louisiana:
This law is hard, but it is both wise and necessary in a land 
of fifteen slaves to one white.  Between the races we cannot 
dig to deep a gulf.  Upon the Negro, we cannot impress too 
much respect for those he serves.  This distinction 
rigorously upheld even after enfranchisement, if the surest 
way to maintain subordination; for the slave must thus see 
that his color is ordained to servanthood, and that nothing 
can make him his master’s equal.79
Finally, the debate of sources demonstrates the importance of identity in Louisiana.  We 
are not just civilian.  We are French Civilian even when the sources of laws indicate 
otherwise.  
2. Narrative No. 2 – Revision of Security Rights
In 1990, Louisiana joined the other forty-nine states by adopting the Article 9 
Secured Transactions provisions into its commercial law. (Louisiana has since referred to 
the provisions as “Chapter 9” instead of Article 9 to “avoid confusion with the articles of 
the Louisiana Civil Code”).80 This section, like the previous, is not a normative dialogue 
of the virtues of Article 9 or their counterweight.  Instead, it’s a narrative, like the first, 
that exposes the norms of civilian culture in Louisiana law.  
In 1967, the Louisiana Law Institute first considered what an adoption of Article 9 
into the Louisiana Civil Law would look like.  The report started like this:
In considering changes in Louisiana law the question 
constantly arises whether the change is consistent with the 
civil law.  Yet there is little agreement as to what the term 
“civil law” means.  Civil law was once defined written law, 
79 Id. 
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but this definition is not helpful today because the common 
law probably contains more written words than the civil 
law.  The volumes of reports and statutes that any common-
law layer must use indicate that it too is written law.  The 
essence of civil law then may be not that it is written but 
that it is written in codes, that is, that large areas of the law 
are regulated, at least in their broad outlines, by systematic 
statutes rather than by judicial opinions or fragmentary 
statutes.  This in turn leads to a methodology or way of 
handling law which emphasizes the creativity of the 
legislatures and the interpretive or interstices-filling 
function of courts.  
In accord with this analysis, it is tempting to say 
that the Uniform Commercial Code is a civilian document 
and the lack of system in the present Louisiana law of 
secured transactions involving movables is uncivilian.  
Louisiana may keep its uniqueness by being the only 
common-law state in the area of commercial transactions.  
However, another element should be introduced, namely 
that by civil law is often meant a system, the substance or 
at least the categories of which are descendents of Roman 
law.  German law before the code of 1900, Roman law 
itself, and present South African law would be classified as 
civil-law systems though not meeting modern standards of 
codification.  But even in the area of legal categories and 
substance it is often hard to say that one idea is civilian and 
another is not.  The difference in substance between Roman 
law and French law today probably exceeds the difference 
between French and English law.  There are also substantial 
differences between modern German law and modern 
French law.  Further common law itself is permeated with 
civilian concepts that have either been arrived at 
independently or have been imported from continental law 
through the courts of equity and cannon law.  Thus to ask 
whether a legal reform is consistent with civil law is at best 
a vague question.81
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The report went on to describe the civilian roots of the then-current Louisiana security 
devises,82 what an article nine transition might look like,83 and to recommend its adoption 
because of the structure of the Uniform Commercial Code, the fact that the devises do not 
differ greatly from traditional Louisiana law, and the commercial benefit of uniformity.84
In other words, the institute attempted to cast Article 9 as a civilian text, or at least one 
that could be civilian with the right surroundings.85
Ultimately, Article 9 was rejected for more than twenty years as “incompatible 
with the Louisiana Civil Code.”86  Then, in 1988 on the urging of Louisiana’s 
commercial community, the Governor proposed the adoption of Article Nine and 
appointed William Hawkland to chair a committee for the preparation of appropriate 
82 Id. at 506 (discussing Roman and French Law security devices in terms of the chattel 
mortgage); id. at 508 (discussing privileges and Louisiana codification); Id. at 511 
(describing Louisiana secured transaction patterns).
83 Id. at 514 et seq (describing the UCC provisions – mortgage, chattel Mortgage, pledge, 
conditional sale, bulk mortgage, and liens); Id. at 527 (“A one sentence description of the 
coverage of article 9 in Louisiana terminology would be the following: article 9 provides 
the basic rules for the creation, ranking, and enforcement of all conventional security 
devices in movables and regulates the sale of certain incorporeal movables such as 
accounts receivable.  It does not purport to regulate non-contractual security rights, 
except as to ranking with conventional devices, or security rights in immovable property, 
except as to borderline cases.  Another way to put it is that article 9 is an all-inclusive 
chattel mortgage, pledge  and assignment of accounts receivable statute.”).     
84 Id. at 554 (“In other words, from a practical standpoint, the ten part division of 
personal property under the UCC is not far different from the fragmentation of movable 
property under the Louisiana Civil Code and Statutes.  The terms represent concepts that 
people dealing in property will designate in one way or another.”).  
85 Id. at 521.  Consider the strong emphasis on the Uniform Commercial Code as a 
“Code” in the civilian sense.  “[The UCC] seems to be an embodiment of the civil law 
principle of the code as a source of law rather than the traditional common-law method in 
which a statute is considered an abrogation of an already existing law.” Id. at 522-23.  
86 COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS IN LOUISIANA: THE 
COMMERCIAL LAWS VI (Herzberger ed., 1974).  See also David S. Willenzik, Hawkland’s 
Handbook on Chapter 9 Louisiana Commercial Laws, 51 LA. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1991) 
(“the first time Louisiana seriously considered adopting Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code was in 1967-68 when the Louisiana Law Institute summarily rejected 
the UCC in its entirety as being contrary to Louisiana Civil Law tradition.”).     
legislation.87  Hawkland’s committee found that four reasons justified adopting Article 
Nine into Louisiana law: the need for uniformity, the need to reduce transaction costs 
relating to obtaining security, the expansion of property types that would be classified as 
security, and providing a greater certainty between state and federal regulation.88 Indeed, 
Hawkland has received much praise for “finally bringing to [Louisiana] Article 9 of the 
UCC.”89
Just as the Civil Law served as an analogue to justify Article 9’s adoption by the 
Law Institute in 1967 (despite rejecting the whole), the Civil law would retain an 
influence over the version that Hawkland would introduce.  For example, several 
provisions were changed from the “uniform” commercial code version that either 
reflected civilian traditions or that did not offend the civil code provisions already in 
place.  Notably, the types of collateral were expanded while use of fixtures as collateral 
was significantly restricted.90 These restrictions reflect a long-held tradition in Louisiana 
law that a security interest cannot be attached to something that is already a fixture. The 
change was necessary to honor not only notions of chattel mortgages present in the state, 
but also the very distinction between movable and immovable property that under gird 
the civil law property system in Louisiana.91  The alteration thus honored tradition and 
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the Code while adopting a provision that mostly brings Louisiana into conformity with its 
sister states. 
The Civilian story transcended the adoption of UCC article 9.  First the Law 
Institute’s initial report caste Article 9, not as a common law vestige, but rather as a 
provision that could be seen in common law terms.  The fact that it was contained in a 
Code and contained a systematic approach certainly aided that distinction.  The ease of 
trasition from traditional civilian tenets  (with French and Roman roots) also was a strong 
case.  When Hawkland proposed his Article 9, the Legislature accepted its provisions 
because it was not offensive to certain tenets of the civil law tradition.  
This is the essential narrative that could be told.  It embraces the civilian approach 
to law.  However, there is also a counter narrative.  For example, consider one 
commentator who reviewing the Louisiana Adoption of Article 9, concedes the 
improvement, also notes that a part of the civilian character is lost:
Louisiana has adopted Article 9 of the U.C.C.  That article 
is among the best-known pieces of private law legislation 
in the world, and needs no discussion here.  I will confine 
myself to three observations.  One is that it does not extend 
to immovables.  The second is that it honours the publicity 
principle, in the sense that nonpossessory security rights 
cannot in general be “perfected” without registration 
(filing).  To that extent it is superior, I would suggest, to the 
current Scots and South African law.  The third observation 
concerns the attachment/ perfection contrast which is 
embedded in article 9.  Is a “perfected security interest” a 
“real right?”  Presumably it is.  Is an “attached,” but 
unperfected security interest a real right?  That is more 
difficult.  Either answer is a problem, for if it is a real right, 
how does it differ from a personal right?  The whole point 
of a security right lies in its third party effect.  Its effect “as 
between the parties” is really no effect, for all the debtors 
assets are in any case available to the creditor.  As the 
Louisiana Civil Code provides “whoever has bound himself 
personally, is obliged to fulfill his engagements out of all 
his property, movable and immovable, present and future.”  
The U.C.C’s idea that there is something called 
“attachment” whereby a security interest takes effect as 
between the parties as distinct from “perfection” which 
involves third-party effect, seems dubious from a civilian 
standpoint.  An outsider may wonder whether Louisiana 
considered this issue before it decided to adopt Article 9 of 
the U.C.C.  No doubt the pressures on Louisiana to adopt 
the U.C.C. were comparable with the pressures on Scotland 
to adopt the floating charge.92
The vision of the civil law’s interaction with the proposed article nine, in this 
commentators view is mediated by a failure to deal consistently with terms of attachment 
and perfection in the civil code’s notion of a property system.  The narrative is thus 
construed as tale that creates more of a problem than a solution. 
Shael Herman narrates the story in a more positive tone:
To promote harmony with its sister states, Louisiana has 
sometimes adopted, and then adapted, legislation from 
mainstream American law. [For example], even when 
Louisiana lawmakers have consciously preferred national 
uniformity over the state’s historical traditions, they have 
reached compromises between the two.  Embedded in the 
working habits of lawyers and Courts, the Civil Code has 
assured that the mainstream American law at issue would 
bear a Civilian stamp.  In the regulation of movable 
security, the Civil Code has remained a repository of 
solutions not expressly articulated in Article 9 of the 
U.C.C.  As a gapfiller and a source of analogies for 
unanticipated cases, the Civil Code fulfills for Louisiana 
lawyers a role played by the general common law 
jurisprudence in the other states.93
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This vision of the Civil law in Louisiana then, according to Shael, is the preservation of a 
Civil Code that both “mediates the common law influence,” as well as translates the 
Common Law rubric into a civilian language.  Thus, Shael notes
Following the nomenclature of the civil code, for example, 
Louisiana’s initial version of U.C.C. article 9 defined real 
estate as “immovable property and real rights therein,” 
personal property as “movable property,” tangibles as 
“corporeal” property, and intangibles as “incorporeal 
property.”  Particularly important for the reformers case in 
favor of Article 9, its enactment did not require short-
circuiting or abandoning the Civil Code, even for security 
devices regulated by the article.  For example, the term 
possession in section 9-109 incorporated the phrase “civil 
possession as defined in Civil Code articles 3421 and 
3431.94
Article 9 was compatible with the civilian system, not just because it did not offend the 
Code, but because in key places it incorporated the code.  
***
Both narratives demonstrate that being civilian means to a certain extent looking 
civilian, sounding civilian, and acting civilian.  The Slavery narrative, though 
demonstrates the pervasive respect and admiration we have for a code.  The Article 9 
narrative in turn, demonstrates how the respect influences and defines the ways we 
approach legal innovation.  
Part III
Why a Nomos
Inhabiting a Nomos is not an option.  Recognizing our Nomos, its effects on the 
way we think about legal problems, and the consequences that come from such 
recognitions is a different story.  My concern with creating new “legal families” is that it 
94 Id. at 466.  
tends to ignore the valuable lessons we learn from self-recognition.  Principally, the 
debate of French versus Spanish influence on the laws of Louisiana is not possible 
without a Nomos; our Court would be constrained against being unique amongst its 
judicial fellows; and our Code would be just another lengthy statute, with very little 
normative material, but just policy decisions by elected officials. 
Instead a Nomos empowers a community to understand what it is, what it is 
becoming, and what it imagines it can be.  As Robert Cover elegantly stated:
The great legal civilizations have, therefore, been marked 
by more than technical virtuosity in their treatment of 
practical affairs, by more than elegance or rhetorical power 
in the composition of their texts, by more, even, than 
genius in the invention of new forms for new problems.  A 
great legal civilization is marked by the richness of the 
nomos in which it is located and which it helps to 
constitute. The varied and complex materials of that nomos 
establish paradigms for dedication, acquiescence, 
contradiction, and resistance.  These materials present not 
only bodies of rules or doctrine to be understood, but also 
worlds to be inhabited.  To inhabit a nomos is to know how 
to live in it.95
And so I return to the initial analogy I offered at the beginning of this essay, and ask, are 
we civilians standing on the walls, guarding our institutions from the encroaching 
barbarians. I say if we inhabit a nomos, we needn’t worry about their vulgar institutions 
on our legal system.  Our nomos defines itself so that the innovation brought by the 
“commoners” need not threaten our own institutional perception.  
Likewise we needn’t sit from the coliseum either, waiting to see which gladiator 
will win our praise.  I say, if we inhabit a nomos the contests that we view as so 
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imperative towards defining who we are, actually don’t define us at all.  Our Nomos 
defines us.  La Fin!
